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Psychotherapist-Patient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture
of Misguided Hope
Ralph Slovenko*
Psychiatrists as well as other related professionals have been led to believe
that a shield statute would protect the communications made to them by
their patients or clients against a demand for disclosure by tribunals and
agencies of the state. The holes that have -been carved in the shield, how-
ever, make it quite apparent now that the proponents for adoption of privi-
lege were false prophets. The hope in privilege was misguided.
The claim to a psychotherapy privilege is based on the idea that a person
will not seek therapy or that the therapeutic effort will be frustrated if not
accorded privacy. The privilege is urged in order to protect the unique hu-
man situation in which a person, through a relationship with another, can
explore the meaning and experiential realities of his life without intrusion.
Freud said that "The whole undertaking becomes lost labour if a single con-
cession is made to secrecy."'
Tending to frustrate privilege, however, are concerns about the dangers
in secrecy, whether or not it has a lawful basis, dealing with individual au-
tonomy or representative government. There can be no mention of secrecy
nowadays without some reference to Watergate. Secrecy there laid the
cover for dirty tricks. Considering that disclosure is salutary in the political
arena in order to maintain representative or accountable government, it
is deemed appropriate to question the justification of a shield in other areas.
Justice prevails, this thesis runs, when lanterns blaze on the antics of all.
Justice Brandeis once observed, "Sunlight is the best of disinfectants."
Exceptions, purportedly designed to achieve balance, have been carved
into the psychotherapy privilege, where it exists, leaving little or no shield
cover-very much resembling a payroll statement where most or all of the
pay has been deducted at the source. These exceptions or deductions in
the privilege law originated in response to the general feeling that privilege
may work an injustice. The privilege appears too available to those who
* Professor of Law and Psychiatry, Wayne State University. This paper was pre-
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would defraud an adversary or insurance company about the extent of an
alleged injury or mislead the state about character or competence.
Moreover, the assertion by psychiatry that a testimonial privilege, which
would be available only for hearings, is essential for the practice of psycho-
therapy has never really been substantiated as far as the legal world is con-
cerned.2  A subpoena or court order for information worries psychiatrists
most, but the demand that affects them and their patients most frequently
comes in the non-courtroom situation, which as stated is not the concern of
privilege-the request for information from an insurance company which
pays for a good part of the psychiatric treatment; from the employer, who
may be paying for the treatment, and who is responsible for the acts of his
employees; from parents or other members of the family who are concerned
about the patient; from the state in such areas as drug use and child abuse;
and from researchers and investigators, who are concerned with the ade-
quacy of treatment.
At one time court actions involving psychotherapists were so rare, or so
little publicized, that few psychotherapists or their patients ever thought
about the need for the legal recognition of a "privileged communication."
Increasingly, however, evidence is sought of psychiatrists in personal injury
litigation and disability claims under insurance programs. The increase in
the number of court actions involving psychiatrists, and recently the White
House-ordered burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's former psychia-
trist, has turned the subject of psychiatric testimony and records into a mat-
ter of public interest.
Fear of disclosure is now said to be widespread. The risk of unwelcome
publicity is said to be deterring psychiatric visitation or inhibiting communi-
cation. People visiting a psychiatrist are said to be thinking, "I won't say
anything which may later be used against me." According to a number
of psychiatrists, many patients are asking about confidentiality, inquiring
whether the fact of their visit or its content will be revealed. As in any
relationship, people interact comfortably only after they begin to trust one
another. Confidentiality is said to be an issue that increasingly has to be
worked through. In today's world, many psychiatrists attempt to reassure
patients by advising them, "I keep no records; and I will reveal nothing
without your permission."
2. To some extent, the plea of privilege may be prompted by the fear that exposure
may threaten or question the therapist's practices, his secrets-not the patient's. See
Modlin, How Private 1y Privacy? PSYCHIATRY DIGEST, Feb. 1969, at 13.
3. See, e.g., Fishein, The Hazards of Consulting a Psychiatrist, Medical World
News, Dec. 28, 1973, at 52.
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"Today, I'm not going to talk about ny goddam mother. An goingto talk about my goddam i insurance company."
Reprinted with permission of ThE NEW YORKER.
Not keeping records or much of a record apparently has always been the
practice. Psychiatry is unlike the legal or medical professions. In the court-
room a stenographer is expected to record every word spoken by any partici-
pant. Without such a record, an appellate system would lose much of its
validity. In medicine too there is emphasis on records which note somatic
therapies and instructions to aides. Medical records constitute an integral
and vitally important part of the medical care process, transmitting informa-
tion as well as facilitating memory. Perhaps this need and determination
to record prompted the belief that extensive records are also kept in psycho-
therapy, widely considered simply a specialized branch of medical practice.
The idea that extensive records are kept in mental hospitals and even in
private office practice is widespread. The order to search the office of Ells-
berg's psychiatrist--"we want the medical files"-reveals the prevailing but
unwarranted identification of psychiatry with medicine. Popular cartoons
portray the psychoanalyst with a writing pad. I.F. Stone urged a close study
1974]
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of the records of Soviet psychiatric institutions which have become available
recently, in order to determine whether individuals were being committed
for political reasons. 4  Those who burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychi-
atrist apparently thought they would find there a gold mine of information.
Ellsberg says that the White House knew about his personal life (from his
girl friends) but it wanted to know something only his psychiatrist knew in
order to blackmail him. Howard Hunt justified the break-in as an attempt
to find out whether Ellsberg "might be a controlled agent of the Soviets." 5
With wry humor, Gore Vidal fantasizes Ellsberg saying to his psychiatrist,
"I have these terrible headaches. They started just after I met my control
Ivan and he said, 'Well, boychick, it's been five years now since you signed
on as a controlled agent. Now I guess you know that if there's one thing
we Sovs hate it's a non-producer so . . .' Doc, I hope you're writing all
this down and not just staring out the window like last time."6  The bur-
glary, as might have been expected, produced no psychiatric or other ma-
terial; the files were empty (and the billing records were at home).
To be sure, there is some variation in the practice of record-keeping.
Training programs demand extensive write-ups, but the practice thereafter
is different. It is customary to keep records of appointments and billings,
but most psychoanalysts and analytically oriented psychotherapists make no
records or notes of patient communications. 7 Some may doodle in order
4. I.F. Stone, Betrayal by Psychiatry, New York Review of Books, Feb. 10, 1972,
at 7. See Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitalization of Political Dissenters in the Soviet
Union, PSYCHIATRIC OPINION, Feb. 1974, at 5; Rogers, Psychiatric Hospitalization of
Political Dissenters, PSYCmATRIC OPINION, Feb. 1974, at 20.
5. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1973, at 30; TIME, Aug. 27, 1973, at 18.
6. Vidal, The Art and Arts of E. Howard Hunt, New York Review of Books, Dec.
13, 1973, at 6.
7. Hollender, Privileged Communication and Confidentiality, 26 DIs. NERv. SYST.
169 (1965); Tanay (Ltr.), Ellsberg Case: What Files? N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1973, at
34.
No useful purpose in psychotherapy would be served by records. Keep in
mind that in intensive psychotherapy there are rarely more than twelve pa-
tients treated by one psychotherapist; there is no problem in remembering. Be-
sides, how could an intense emotional relationship be developed if one of the
participants would be sitting and scribbling notes? Once you have those
notes, what would you do with them?
Letter from Dr. Emanuel Tanay to the author, Dec. 24, 1973.
A distinction is to be drawn between psychotherapy and other forms of psychiatric
treatment, particularly institutional care, where somatic therapy is usually involved.
Even here, many hospitals, because of the increasing (non-judicial) demand for photo-
static copies of records-which are released because of the patient's signed consent
(usually obtained without explanation) or coercion out of need for insurance benefits-
there is a tendency to record very little or to carefully censor what is put down. A
hospital, though, must have some records if it wishes to keep its accreditation. A
number of hospitals have lost their accreditation because their records were deemed in-
adequate. Now with the Professional Standards Review Organization program on the
horizon (the 1972 PSRO law mandates peer review of Medicaid and Medicare hospital
treatment by 1976), and insurance companies and government programs demanding
[Vol. 23:649
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to keep awake. Some may keep notes for clinical studies, or for teaching
resources. Dr. Sandor Rado, for example, never took notes except for
dreams; he had a particular interest in dreams. Some write down in order
to aid in decoding; the psychiatrist's role is, among other things, that of a
translator and interpreter of a foreign language, so to speak. For exam-
ple, a person reports a dream about birds coming through the window at-
tacking him/her; the dream and the interpretation-"You want to kill your
baby"-may be recorded.
Assuming there is a record, it would not pass muster under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule, which allows the admission of records
only when they have a high degree of accuracy and are customarily checked
as to correctness.8 There may be "truth in lending" but there is no "truth"
in entertainment or psychotherapy. Psychotherapy is concerned with man's
struggle to cope with internally or externally induced stresses. The law
is concerned with the outside world, i.e., with objective facts, that which
is called truth. The psychotherapist, on the other hand, is not engaged in
a fact-finding process; he acts as a guide in a "corrective emotional experi-
ence." He "sets the stage," so to speak, so that the patient confronts and
integrates what has been previously too painful and unacceptable.
Actually, where a psychiatrist is subpoenaed, the attorney does not await
-his testimony or records with bated breath. The records, if any, are illegible
or cryptic; and many psychiatrists say that since records are rarely kept they
could destroy theirs without arousing suspicion. In lieu of records, if called
as a witness, the psychiatrist is not apt to be a friendly one.
The primary purpose of the attorney issuing the subpoena, in effect, is
not to investigate but rather to intimidate the opposing party into foregoing
or settling the case. Privilege offers no protection against such blackmail.
Since the privilege covers only the content of a communication and not the
fact of a relationship, the identity of a treating psychiatrist can be elicited
under a discovery demand. Pressure then can be brought to bear which
justification for the hospitalization, or length of stay, hospitals are demanding that their
staffs maintain records in sufficient detail to justify both. Senator Eagleton was done
in by a hospital record, revealing hospital admission and electroshock therapy for de-
pression, though psychodynamics or psychiatric history did not come to light. Thus,
while the files of a hospital may be brief, the very fact of a hospital record results
in ignominy.
8. See In re Herron, 212 N.W.2d 474 (Iowa 1973). The law generally takes words
literally, but in psychotherapy as in lovemaking, decoding is part of the process. The
word "stop," for example, in therapy or love may mean stop or it may mean "please
go on," but a stop sign in law means only stop. Esther Vilar, who claims that women
have trained men to become their slaves, decodes the expression, "I love him," as mean-
ing, "He is an excellent workhorse." E. VILAR, THE MANIPULATED MAN 49 (1974)
See Szasz, Scientific Method and Social Role in Medicine and Psychiatry, 101 A.M.A.
ARCHlVES OF INTERNAL MED. 228 (1958).
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frightens the patient, notwithstanding assurances from his attorney, into
thinking that all his statements made in psychotherapy will be revealed in
open court. It is impossible to estimate the number of cases which patients
have dropped or feared to initiate because of the apprehension of disclo-
sure.9 Many persons feel that they will become objects of stigma, censure
and ridicule if even disclosure of the relationship is made. "If one thing
was made perfectly clear in this first slow, polite day of Senate Committee
hearings on the nomination of Representative Gerald R. Ford to be Vice-
President," wrote the New York Times, "it is that consulting a psychiatrist
or psychotherapist is still an unforgivable sin for an American politician."' 10
Two developments have come to pass. One development, that within the
legal system, is the idea that psychiatric testimony or records has special
value or relevancy, although in general we offer only "a penny for your
thoughts." (In the Old Testament, Joseph was made the most powerful
man in Pharoah's kingdom because of his ability to interpret dreams.) The
other development, that in the psychiatric field, is the idea that a shield law
would protect against a demand for information in court.
Approximately thirty-six states have a physician-patient privilege; but
while psychiatrists are licensed in the practice of medicine, they have come
to find that the medical privilege is so riddled with qualifications and excep-
tions that it does not adequately meet the needs of patients in psychother-
apy.11 In 1959 Georgia enacted a specific "privilege for communication be-
tween psychiatrist and patient.' 2 That statute says nothing more; it is more
in the nature of a commandment or injunction than a law, and probably
would receive a grade of failure if submitted in a law class on legal drafts-
manship, yet it is probably respected more than the detailed statutes--dem-
onstrating that it is not the statute but the spirit about the issue that is deter-
minative.
The Group for the Advancment of Psychiatry (GAP), in 1960, urged the
enactment of legislation granting the same privilege to psychiatrist-patient
communications as exists between attorney and client. Professor Joseph
9. Letter from Dr. Maurice Grossman, Chairman of American Psychiatric Associ-
ation Task Force on Confidentiality, to the author.
10. Dr. Arnold A. Hutschnecker, whose name has been so associated with President
Nixon, is writing a book to be called "The Drive for Power," asking why politicians,
if they need help, should not avail themselves of the services of a therapist, and de-
scribing the drive for power that sometimes may lead to violent behavior on the part
of statesmen. Hutschnecker, The Stigma of Seeing a Psychiatrist, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
1973, at 39.
11. The legislative and jurisprudential restrictions on the medical privilege are enu-
merated in R. SLOVENKO & G. USDIN, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND PRIVI-
LEGED COMMUNICATION (1966).
12. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418 (Supp. 1960).
[Vol. 23: 649
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Goldstein and Dr. Jay Katz of Yale University pointed out the difficulties
which would arise from legislation by mere reference to the attorney-client
privilege,18 whereupon GAP revised its proposal and urged the enactment
of a long and detailed psychotherapist-patient privilege similar to that em-
bodied in a 1961 Connecticut statute.' 4  (Goldstein and Katz were mem-
bers of the committee that prepared the Connecticut bill.) The Connecticut
law is the model of a number of recently enacted statutes.
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence omit a medical privilege but
recommend a psychotherapist-patient privilege (Rule 504), also modeled
on the Connecticut law. This proposed rule, along with several others,
evoked considerable criticism. Two committees of the American Bar Asso-
ciation recommended to the A.B.A. House of Delegates "the complete aboli-
tion of any and all privilege in the physician-patient area including the pro-
posed 'psychotherapist-patient privilege.'" The Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Represenatives, after extensive hearings, recommended and
the House approved (Feb. 6, 1974) the scrapping of all the proposed rules
on privileges and left the federal law of privileges unchanged, to wit, that
the federal courts are to apply the state's privilege law in actions founded
upon a state-created right or defense, while in other civil cases and in crim-
inal cases the principles of the common law, as interpreted by the federal
courts in the light of reason and experience, would be applied.
The proposed rule ran into difficulty because it had become enmeshed
with related politically hot issues of news media privilege and presidential
privilege. Another of the controversial elements entering into the discussion
on privilege, other than these claims for privilege, was instigated by Dr. Ern-
est B. Howard, Executive Vice President of the American Medical Associa-
tion. He advocated the deletion of Rule 504, which he viewed as being
a replacement for the old physician-patient privilege. He wrote to the chair-
men of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees decrying -the absence of
a physician-patient privilege and sought the reintroduction of the proposed
physician-patient privilege found in the Uniform Rules of Evidence of 1953,
although this rule, -as carried out in various states, is so full of exceptions
that it offers little or no shield.
The observation of Judge Spencer A. Gard (chairman of the special com-
mittee of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws that drafted the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence) about the physicianpatient privilege enacted in
1959 in Illinois is also applicable to the Uniform Rule proposal:
13. Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the
Connecticut Statute, 118 AM. J. oF PsYcIuATRY 733 (1962).
14. CoNN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146d (1974).
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[T]he exceptions contained in the act are so comprehensive that
. . . there is scarcely any room left for the privilege to operate,
which leads to the conjecture that the statute is a legislative sanc-
tion of professional ethics in the interest of the medical profession
rather than a response to a demand of public interest for the cur-
tailment of judicial inquiry.' 5
History 'has a way of repeating itself. The psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege, like the medical privilege, offers a shield that is pierceable. It is, as
stated, a form of a zero-sum game. Like the Roman god Janus, the law
on privilege faces in opposite directions at the same time-what it gives with
one hand it takes away -with the other. Virtually nothing is shielded by
the shield. In every jurisdiction, the exceptions and implied waivers are so
many and so broad that it is difficult to imagine a case in which the privi-
lege applies. The most common form of forfeiture is the one in which a
patient is said to waive the privilege by injecting his condition into litiga-
tion, as when his condition is an element of claim or defense. In this vein,
one provision in no-fault automobile insurance legislation expressly and com-
pletely eliminates the statutory physician-patient privilege.'( In another ex-
ception, involving proceedings for hospitalization, the interests of both pa-
tient and public are said to call for a departure from confidentiality. An-
other exception is made in child-custody cases out of regard for the best
interests of the child.
The commentator on privilege is thus in a position analogous to that of
the history professor who was invited to give a lecture on the private life
of Catherine of Russia. He began his lecture: "Gentlemen, I am to lecture
on the private life of Catherine of Russia. Gentlemen, Catherine of Russia
had no private life."
California's psychotherapist-patient privilege, enacted in 1965, was tested
five years later in the much publicized case involving Dr. Joseph E. Lif-
schutz.' 7 The case was featured on the Law page of Time,18 and was re-
ported at numerous meetings of psychiatric societies and in psychiatric and
15. S. GARD, ILLINOIs EVIDENCE MANUAL 549 (1963). Moreover, the physician-pa-
tient privilege as a practical matter is eliminated in diversity cases in federal courts
under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective in 1938.
Under that rule, a party physically examined pursuant to court order, by requesting and
obtaining a copy of the report or by taking the deposition of the examiner, waives any
privilege regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined him in re-
spect of the same condition. While waiver under Rule 35 may be avoided by neither
requesting the report nor taking the examiner's deposition, the price is one which most
litigant-patients are probably not prepared to pay. PRoPosED FEDERAL RULES OF EVI-
DENCE, rule 501, Advisory Comm. Note.
16. See, e.g., Mich. Act 294, Public Acts of 1972, §§ 3158-59.
17. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
18. TIME, April 27, 1970, at 60.
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psychoanalytic bulletins and news letters. To cover legal expenses, the
Northern California Psychiatric Society made a nationwide appeal to psychi-
atrists for contributions. The American Psychoanalystic Association and the
National Association for Mental Health filed amicus curiae briefs. Although
great effort was exerted on behalf of privilege, the case illustrates the irrele-
vancy of privilege law (as well as the irrelevancy of much psychiatric testi-
mony).
Joseph F. Housek, a high school teacher, brought a $175,000 damage suit
against John Arabian, a student, alleging an assault which caused "physical
injuries, pain, suffering, and severe mental and emotional distress." During
a deposition taken by defense counsel, Housek stated that he had received
psychiatric treatment ten years earlier from Dr. Lifschutz over a six month
period. The defendant then subpoenaed Dr. Lifschutz and Housek's psy-
chiatric records. Dr. Lifschutz not only refused to produce any of his rec-
ords, assuming there were any, but declined to disclose whether or not Hou-
sek had consulted him or had been his patient.
Upon the psychiatrist's refusal to cooperate, defendant Arabian sought a
court order compelling Dr. Lifschutz to answer questions on deposition and
to produce the subpoenaed records. The court determined that the plain-
tiff had put his mental and emotional condition in issue by instituting the
pending litigation, and the statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege did not
apply. The privilege, belonging to the patient-not to the physician-is
waivable by the patient in the act of bringing suit.
Statements made by a patient to a physician or a psychiatrist as to the
symptoms and effects of his injury or malady are admissible in evidence on
his behalf as an exception to the hearsay rule. Under the sporting theory
of justice it is deemed only fair that the defendant also have the benefit
of these statements when they are favorable to him. Since the privilege is
intended as a shield and not a sword, it is considered dissolved or waived
by the patient when he makes a legal issue of his physical or mental condi-
tion. Thus, when plaintiff Housek claimed that he had suffered "emotional
distress" as a result of the injuries he had suffered, the privileged status of
his communications with his psychiatrist was waived.
The permissible scope of inquiry, in Lifschutz as well as other cases, de-
pends upon the nature of the injuries which the plaintiff-litigant himself has
brought before the court. The crucial test is one of relevancy or materiality:
disclosure is compelled only with respect to the mental condition put in is-
sue; disclosure of other aspects of the patient-litigant's personality is not
compelled. Thus, in Lifschutz, for example, the defendant would not be
authorized to demand examination of plaintiff's psychotherapeutic commu-
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nications to determine if he had ever exhibited aggressive tendencies or other
such personal attributes. The plaintiff had not put in issue such elements
of his mental condition merely by instituting an action for damages resulting
from assault. However, if the issue had been "who started the affray?"
rather than "did the damages result from the assault?" then evidence of
character, that is, whether or not the patient had ever exhibited aggressive
tendencies, would have been relevant and material. The logic would be:
"Quarrelsome men are more likely than others to commit assaults. Mr.
X is quarrelsome; Mr. Y is peaceable. In an affray between the two, it
is more likely that Mr. X was the aggressor."
As a theoretical principle, with relevancy or materiality as the guideline,
the burden rests upon the patient to show that a given communication is
not directly related to the issue he has tendered to the court.19 Only the
patient knows 'both the nature of the injury for which recovery is sought
and the general content of the psychotherapeutic communications. He may
either have to delimit his assertion of "mental or emotional distress" or ex-
plain the object of the psychotherapy in order to convince the court that
the psychotherapeutic communications sought are not directly relevant to the
mental condition that he has placed in issue. With a little bit of luck, from
the patient's viewpoint, the court as a matter of course, without any showing,
will rule that psychotherapeutic communications are irrelevant and immate-
rial, or that other, less prejudicial evidence is available. Psychiatric evi-
dence may say, for example, that Mr. Y is so inhibited that he would not
likely be an aggressor, but classmates may be readily available to testify that
he would be reluctant even to return a volleyball serve.
In any event, the statutory privilege as a guideline is "much sound and
fury signifying nothing." The privilege is a venture that gains nothing. The
practice in states where there is no physician-patient privilege or psychother-
apist-patient privilege is the same as in states where there is a privilege.
Moreover, in states which have enacted a privilege, the practice is generally
found to 'be the same thereafter as it was before enactment. 20  The harm
19. In some situations the pleadings may clearly demonstrate that the patient is
placing his entire mental condition in issue and that history of past psychotherapy will
be relevant. This was illustrated when a mental patient in a prison hospital sought
release, contending that he was not a dangerous or violent individual as the state men-
tal health officials asserted. When the patient's medical records were offered to sub-
stantiate the state's position, he claimed such records were privileged. The court,
analogizing the facts before it to those of the patient-litigant exception to the medical
privilege, found that "petitioner himself caused his mental condition to be put in issue
by his application for habeas corpus and averments of his brief." In re Cathey, 55
Cal. 2d 679, 361 P.2d 426, 12 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1961).
20. Dr. Jonas R. Rappeport of Maryland, however, says that in his experience prior
to 1965 (when Maryland enacted a privilege) attorneys quite frequently used the lack
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done, though, by privilege law is that the privilege gives an undue sense
of importance to communications in psychotherapy. The privilege concept
tends to invest them with an aura or sense of relevancy and materiality to
issues on trial.
Because ithe real test is one of relevancy or materiality (which arises re-
garding all evidence in every trial) we must ask: "what are the material
issues," and "what is relevant or competent to establish them?" In other
words, does the item of evidence tend to prove that precise contention or
fact which is sought to be proved? In every case where the testimony or
records of a physician or psychotherapist have been required by a court,
it was because the evidence was deemed relevant or material to an issue
in the case. As a consequence, in the last analysis, the confidentiality of
a physician-patient or psychotherapist-patient communication is protected
from disclosure in a courtroom only by a showing that the communication
would have no relevance or materiality to the issues in the case. 21
What about criminal cases, which involve a court-ordered examination?
Here, the law on self-incrimination and coerced confession, rather than privi-
lege, governs the scope of admissible psychiatric testimony. What happens
is that testimony is permitted with the caution to the jury that "the psychia-
trist's testimony is only to be used in determining defendant's sanity and not
his guilt." The shield law has been phased out of criminal cases on the
of privilege as the basis for going on "fishing expeditions" through psychiatrists' rec-
ords. He states that since the law has been passed there has been a cessation in Mary-
land of such "fishing trips," although in law the exceptions to privilege would allow
the same fishing as would prevail under a situation of no privilege. He observes:
While I recognize that the crucial test is one of relevancy and materiality,
I still believe that certain patients or at least their psychiatrist need to feel
secure in a privilege statute when asking for or receiving reassurance that
communications essentially are privileged. While this may not in itself be as
necessary for the type of very intensive relationship that occurs in a psycho-
analytic practice, I do believe that in the practice of psychotherapy at lesser
levels of intensity when strong transference neuroses do not develop that such
reassurances are indicated and, in fact, very necessary for the smooth opera-
tion of a treatment program.
Letter from Dr. Jonas R. Rappeport to the author, March 4, 1974.
21. A motion to quash a subpoena is in order when other evidence more relevant
and material is available, or would be less onerous to obtain. Such a procedure might
even protect a patient from having to state in discovery processes whether or not he
ever saw a psychiatrist. Even under the patient-litigant exception, the judge ought to
determine whether or not there are other available sources from which to obtain the
information; and if not, to propound the questions that need clarification to resolve the
issue at hand, and limit testimony to those factors. It may be noted that a bill to
protect newsmen, who have more relevant and material evidence to offer than a treating
psychotherapist, would require disclosure only if the party seeking the information satis-
fied the court that the information was indispensible to the prosecution or defense of
the case, could not be obtained from any other source, and that there was a compelling
public interest in disclosure. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1974, at 41.
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theory that it is applicable, at best, only -to a treating psychiatrist and not
to an examining one, where the relationship is likely to be one entered into
at arm's length.
22
The various rules which have been developed to restrict the role of an
examining psychiatrist are rooted in constitutional principles against self-in-
crimination and coerced confession. Michigan, for example, provides that
a psychiatrist who conducts a competency-to-stand-trial examination may not
be called in to testify in the criminal trial if there is an objection to the
admission of such testimony by the defendant.23  A Massachusetts statute
grants a privileged status to a confession of crime made to a psychiatrist
who examines the defendant while in custody under a mandatory examina-
tion statute (the so-called Briggs law).
24
It is interesting to speculate how the privilege would affect a treating psy-
chiatrist whose patient is an accused criminal. DeWitt, in his comprehen-
sive book, Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient, says
that "It may safely be assumed, we believe, that the privilege under proper
circumstances, extends to all criminal actions and proceedings in [twenty-
22. See, e.g., People v. Schrantz, 213 N.W.2d 257 (Mich. 1973); Massey v. State,
226 Ga. 703, 177 S.E.2d 79 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 964 (1971); Note, Patient-
Psychiatrist Privilege Does Not Apply to Mental Examination by a Court-Appointed
Psychiatrist, 21 J. PUB. L. 251 (1972).
23. People v. Martin, 386 Mich. 407, 192 N.W.2d 215 (1972); People v. Garland, 44
Mich. App. 243, 205 N.W.2d 195 (1972), citing MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 767.27a(4)
(1968), which provides: "The diagnostic report and recommendations shall be admissi-
ble as evidence in the hearing [on competency to stand trial], but not for any other pur-
pose in the pending criminal proceeding." See also State v. Fontana, 152 N.W.2d 503
(Minn. 1967).
24. Apart from special rules, these situations would seem to be covered by constitu-
tional limitations on admissibility of evidence. A. MOENSSENs, R. MOSES & F. INBAU,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 87 (1973); Note, 15 STAN. L. REV. 538
(1963). The prevailing practice is that a defendant who asserts a defense of insanity
cannot claim possible self-incrimination if ordered to be examined by a court psychia-
trist; and if he persists in that claim, he is deemed to have waived his insanity defense.
However, the defendant's waiver permits the psychiatrist to testify only as to the facts
which form the basis of his opinion on the question of sanity.
It is not permissible to use the psychiatric examination as a source of evidence which
would be relevant on the issue of guilt. Thus, admissions to the crime cannot be con-
sidered in determining whether the defendant committed the acts constituting the crime
charged, but they can apparently be used insofar as they relate to the defendant's men-
tal state. Lee v. County Court of Erie County, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 267 N.E.2d 452 (1969),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
In any event, it is to be noted that what is not achieved directly is often achieved
indirectly. As no opinion is value-free, a confession to the psychiatrist by a person
charged with, say, public drunkenness, that he has recently cut a person's throat will
color the psychiatrist's report on competency to stand trial, or on criminal responsibil-
ity. When this type of information is made known to the psychiatrist, he is likely to




two] jurisdictions. '2 5 However, the protection of a shield law is more a
product of belief than fact. Many of the medical privilege statutes in the
jurisdictions enumerated by DeWitt are made inapplicable to homicide pros-
ecutions where the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate cir-
cumstances of the homicide. The Illinois psychiatrist-patient privilege, en-
acted in 1963, four years after passage of a physician-patient privilege, ex-
pressly states that it does not extend to criminal proceedings in which the
patient introduces his mental condition as an element of defense. California
and most other states except all criminal proceedings.
As a matter of practice in all states, however, a prosecutor is not likely
to call a treating psychiatrist as a witness against his patient. It would likely
boomerang. The case of a man whom we shall call John Voyeur, a man
of vision, comes to mind. Mr. Voyeur engaged in the practice of breaking
into homes when no one was there in order to drill a hole in the bathroom
wall which would permit a good view from the outside. On one occasion,
unhappily for him, he was apprehended while breaking and entering. As
in this case, the fact that a defendant has been seeing a psychiatrist is not
advanced by the prosecutor; in the event of trial, a prosecutor would estab-
lish the commission of the act or mens rea independently of the treating
psychiatrist. The fact of treatment is, instead, brought up by defense coun-
sel, as a show of rehabilitation, in plea bargaining or obtaining a dismissal
of the charge.
But suppose Mr. Voyeur is picked up and charged with writing bad
checks. Evidence of voyeuristic tendencies would be legally immaterial, im-
permissible evidence of character. To allow such evidence would smack of
-the ludicrous proceeding in Woody Allen's Bananas. In this film, Woody
Allen traveled to St. Garbage, South America, and became involved with a
rebel group. In a trial for treason, an F.B.I. agent testified that he was
dangerous, inferred from the fact that he was a New York Jew and had
marched in protest parades. In an effort -to impeach the witness, Woody
Allen serving as his own attorney on cross-examination asked the witness,
"Have you ever had sex with a girl with a big breast?" "Yes," replied the
witness. "And how was it?" "Exotic," the witness replied. Woody Allen
was just checking, he said, but the testimony on direct and cross-examination
does illustrate the significance or lack of significance, or absurdity, that "evi-
dence" may reach.
The crusade and the hullabaloo over privilege in civil or criminal cases,
as mentioned, insinuates that the content of a psychotherapy session may
25. C. DEWITT, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 238-
(1958).
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be relevant or material in litigation. Out of a sense of pride a person may
fear disclosure of the confidences he makes about his sexual life, his depend-
ency, his insecurity, his struggle in interpersonal relations, all interspersed
with fantasy. But these subjects have little or no significance in legal pro-
ceedings. The dialectic of one's right of privacy versus the danger that se-
crecy will allow truth to go undetected is not here the contest. One indi-
vidual, when in analysis with Dr. Karl Menninger, told about relating one
of his dreams to his wife. Dr. Menninger said tersely, "Your unconscious
is none of your wife's business." Nor should it be the court's as it can only
confuse and complicate matters. The sunlight advocated 'by Justice Bran-
deis would not come from disclosure of psychotherapy sessions, even if they
were tape recorded.
20
It is widely considered that a treating psychiatrist, seeing the patient over
a period of time without apparent motive to deceive, has more to offer the
court than an examining psychiatrist, and somehow, from childhood on, the
value of information seems to increase in direct proportion to its prior se-
crecy. In fact, though, a psychiatrist appointed to carry out an examination
usually obtains in one hour more information related to the legal issues with-
out a promise of confidentiality, than a treating psychiatrist who may have
seen the patient over a period of years. An examiner conducts an inter-
view with the legal issue directly in mind, whereas in therapy the subject
may never come up or if it does it may be diluted with fantasy and associa-
tion. The issue, to repeat, is not privilege but rather the relevancy or ma-
teriality of the communication; in some cases, where the psychiatrist is an
agent of the state, the issue may 'be the constitutional limitations on its use.
Apart from the foregoing considerations dealing with the substance of a
26. In Kilarjian v. Horwath, 379 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1967), an action for personal
injuries and property damage sustained in a collision between plaintiff's automobile and
defendant's truck, medical experts testified on behalf of the plaintiff that the shock of
the collision produced a nerve root irritation which affected plaintiff's left arm. The
defendant asserted that the condition was not caused by the accident, and further as-
serted that plaintiff was actually suffering from a "conversion reaction" stemming from
his anxieties about his one and one-half year separation from his wife and children,
and his frustrated desire to marry his secretary with whom he had been living. The
trial judge refused to admit into evidence the portions of the psychiatric report of a
neurological examination of plaintiff which stated that the plaintiff had been living
with his secretary and intended to marry her. In affirming judgment for the plaintiff,
the appellate court noted the established principle that it is within the discretion of the
trial judge to exclude evidence, though otherwise admissible, when he is convinced that
it will create a danger of prejudice which outweighs its probative value. The case law
recognizes that certain circumstances call for the exclusion of evidence, even when of
unquestioned relevance, if its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." PRo-
POSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, rule 403.
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communication, the way of privilege is not the route to take to protect com-
munications in psychotherapy. A privilege is a privata lex, a special law
intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person or class of persons.
If the privilege route is taken, the definition of the parties to the shielded'
relationship needs to be reevaluated in light of new therapy techniques
which question the medical model of mental illness.
Traditional privilege posits a dyadic relationship, a one-to-one relation-
ship, which was commonplace in a simpler day. But today psychotherapy
may take place in community centers or clinics, where many people may
have contact with the patient. Group therapy is another innovation which
casts doubt on a privilege based on a dyadic relationship. Some predict that
the day is near when almost all therapy will take place in groups; this may
be an overstatement but it is indicative of the trend. Revelations in such
sessions would not be covered by traditional privilege statutes by virtue of
an interpretation which holds that third parties pollute confidentiality.
27
In arriving at a determination of which healers should be covered under
privilege, the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, being composed of
psychiatrists, sought in its proposal of 1960 to cover the "psychiatrist-pa-
tient" relationship. The proposal recommended no coverage for psycholo-
gists, social workers, counselors, or other psychotherapists. Through lobby-
ing in some states, psychologists and social workers have obtained a privilege
as part of the licensing or certification law. In general, though, the trend
is to move for a "psychotherapist-patient" privilege as part of the code of
evidence. The proposed but House-rejected Federal Rules of Evidence, like
the new laws adopted in some states, define a "psychotherapist" as a medi-
cal doctor who devotes all or part of his time to the practice of psychiatry,
and a licensed or certified psychologist who devotes all or part of his time
to the practice of clinical psychology. The privilege extends to communica-
tions made to pretenders who are reasonably believed by their patients to
be medical doctors, as well as general practitioners doing part time counsel-
ing whether or not they have special qualifications.28 Unlicensed therapists
27. Be that as it may, group members begin to see that the whole group effective-
ness is built on mutual trust, and they lose all concern, perhaps without warrant, about
the possibility that a member of the group may tell an outsider about something that
has been said in the group meetings. As people begin to treat one another and feel
more secure, they lose all concern about the possibility of disclosure of what has been
said.
28. PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, rule 504(a) (2) sought to cover "a per-
son authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably believed by
the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emo-
tional condition, including drug addiction" (italics added). Professor Krattenmaker il-
lustrates:
If the family doctor inquires, "How did you sprain your ankle?" and the re-
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and counselors of all kinds, including psychologists, however, can be
required to reveal the confidences of those whom they have counseled, even
if the patients thought what they were saying was privileged and believed
the therapists to be licensed. The Advisory Committee had said that the
distinction made between unlicensed persons thought to be medical doctors
and unlicensed persons doing psychotherapy "is believed to be justified by
the number of persons, other than psychiatrists, purporting to render psycho-
therapeutic aid and the variety of their theories."
Psychiatric social workers, among others, were not included in that pro-
posed rule nor are they recognized by other evidence codes. Can the omis-
sion be justified? Social workers, the mainstay of staffs of most public
health facilities, are called the "poor man's psychiatrist." Their clients are
referred to as "patients." Since it is the therapeutic function, rather than
any particular group, that the law on privilege is theoretically designed to
protect, there is little justification for extending privileged status to one group
and denying it to another that is functionally accomplishing the same thing.
29
Moreover, to draw a distinction between various types of therapists is hard
to justify since there is no evidence that one type of psychotherapy produces
better results than another. For that matter, very little has been done in
evaluation of the effectiveness of psychotherapy, be it in general psychiatry
or psychoanalysis. (One might add incidentally that this is true of our en-
sponse is, "While walking my mistress home from a date," the response is not
privileged. If the family doctor asks, "Why are you depressed?" and the pa-
tient says, "Because I just murdered my mistress," the patient's statement is
privileged ....
Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 70 (1973).. Ivan Illich, a leading advocate of the view that professionals do not pursue aims in
society's best interests, observes:
Most curable sickness can now be diagnosed and treated by laymen. People
find it so difficult to accept this statement because the complexity of medical
ritual has hidden from them the simplicity of its basic procedures. It took
the example of the barefoot doctor in China to show how modem practice
by simple workers in their spare time could, in three years, catapult health
care in China to previously unparalleled levels. In most other countries
health care by laymen is considered a crime.
I. ILLIcH, The Professions as a Form of Imperialism, NEw SOCIETY, Sept. 13, 1973 at
634, in TOOLS FOR CONVIVIALITY (1973).
29. See Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the Psychothera-
pist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1050
(1973). The American Psychiatric Association's Council on Emerging Issues recently
appointed a task force to draft a position paper on the topic, "What Is a Psychiatrist-
What is Mental Illness?" Psychiatric News, Nov. 21, 1973, at 13, col. 3. Should a
patrolman or parole officer have some measure of privilege when he is acting in the role
of counselor? Only a small percentage of citizens' requests for service from the police
department relate to crime. The Police Department of Kansas City, Mo., for example,
receives about 1,300 calls per day, and of these calls only 91, or 7% relate to crime
in any way. 93% of the calls relate to emergency service, conflict resolution, and
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tire educational enterprise.30 ) The major determinants of outcome in psy-
chotherapy, it seems, are not therapeutic procedures per se, or what is said.
Rather, personal qualities of therapist and patient and the concordance be-
tween the patient's belief as to his needs and the, therapeutic method em-
ployed are more apt to affect the result. The source to which the patient
attributes his symptoms, which is a function of his education and cultural
status, and the views of the therapist he happens to encounter, determine
whether the relationship will be successful."'
The other party to the relationship is usually called a "patient," which
may be used for lack of a better term. "Sufferee" sounds like women's liber-
ation; "client" sounds too commercial; "counselee," "student," or "pupil" are
associated with schools. In ordinary conversation the term "patient" has
medical connotations: a patient is a sick individual under the care and
treatment of a physician or surgeon-a client for medical services. But "pa-
tient" as an adjective also refers to one who bears pains or trials calmly
or uncomplainingly, one who is not hasty-and considering the length of
psychotherapy, it is an apt term. "Patient" is defined in the Proposed Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence as "a person who consults or is examined or inter-
viewed by a psychotherapist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his
mental or emotional condition."
Privileged status dependent on the professional designation is not war-
ranted. What difference does it make whether a person achieves a "correc-
tive emotional experience" by talking with a psychiatrist, psychologist, social
worker, preacher, or a good friend? Some people may have only a pet,
miscellaneous requests. Letter from James R. Newman, Assistant Chief of Police, Kan-
sas City, Mo. to the author, Nov. 20, 1973. A parole officer likewise has the task
of being both law enforcement officer and social worker. Wicker, The Lessons of Pa-
role, N.Y. Times, March 8, 1974, at 33, col. 5. Some say that the hairdresser is the
closest confidant of women. John Steinbeck observed:
When women go to a hairdresser, something happens to them. They feel
safe, they relax. The hairdresser knows what their skin is like under the
makeup; he knows their age; they don't have to keep up any kind of pretense.
Women tell a hairdresser things they wouldn't dare confess to a priest, and
they are open about matters they'd try to conceal from a doctor.
J. STmNBEcK, TRAVELS WITH CHARLEY: IN SEARCH OF AMERICA (1962). While it may
be argued that talking is not the essence of hairdressing, as it is of psychoanalysis, the
modern girl may really let her hair down while at the hairdresser. The average Amer-
ican woman between the ages of eighteen and eighty spends approximately two and
one-half hours per week in the beauty salon, and the hairdresser provides whatever
service she needs-lover, baby-sitter, psychiatrist, physician, father confessor, marriage
counselor, marriage wrecker-all for the price of a shampoo and set. N. Louoos, THE
HAPPY HAIRDRESSER (1973).
30. See Wallerstein & Freedman, The Future of Analysis-A Rebuttal and a Re-
joinder, Psychiatric News, Nov. 7, 1973, at 6-7.
31. Frank, Psychotherapy: The Restoration of Morale, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 271
(1974).
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purebred or mongrel, two-legged or four-legged, to turn to. Little Orphan
Annie seems to talk only to Sandy, her dog. A pet lover who fashions a
pet into a confidant may wonder whether communications to the pet are
privileged and if not, why not, or why there is no owner-pet shield. After
all, the law shields the lawyer-client, husband-wife, and priest-penitent rela-
tionships. Using Dean John Wigmore's oft-cited criteria for privilege, it may
be said that the law inadequately protects owner-pet communications: it can
be demonstrated that a communication between owner and pet is made in
confidence, that violation of the confidence is detrimental to the purpose of
the relationship, that the relationship is one that should be fostered, and that
the injury to the relationship through public disclosure of the communication
is greater than the benefit to justice to be derived therefrom.
There is an intense relationship 'between man/woman and his/her pet;
they form a unity.8 2 Senator George Vest, in his famous eulogy to the dog
delivered in 1870, said: "The one absolutely unselfish friend that a man
can have in this selfish world, the one that never deserts him and the one
that never proves ungrateful or treacherous is his dog." A pet is sometimes
regarded as a child or marital partner, and the pet's name is even signed
on everything-for example, "Best wishes from Judy and Seymour" (Sey-
mour is the dog). 3 The relationship is so close that some psychiatrists con-
duct "pet therapy," in which the patient is seen along with his pet. The
practitioner of this type of therapy appreciates the fact that a patient can
best be understood or can best work out his problems through his experi-
ences with his pet. The pet is not an allowable tax exemption or deduction
like a medical expense but nonetheless it may represent the deepest and
highest aspirations in the life of the owner. People choose pets resembling
not only their outer image (Elizabeth Taylor tinted her hair the same color
32. There are many common sayings about dogs and people. "You can't teach an
old dog new tricks" is often used to describe a person who refuses to change his ways,
or to learn a new way of doing something. "Barking dogs never bite" describes people
who sound more dangerous than they really are. "Barking up the wrong tree" means
to look for something in the wrong place. "Let sleeping dogs lie" means to leave a
situation undisturbed. "Tail wagging the dog" means, among other things, that an un-
important member of the group is actually directing everyone's activities. "Every dog
has his day" is an expression used when something pleasant happens to a person, es-
pecially one who has been having bad luck.
33. A man tends to call his wife or girl friend "Pet" when they are on good terms.
One observer notes that children away at school who get the most homesick are those
who have pets awaiting them at home. E. Reed, Off the Record (syndicated cartoon),
Feb. 4, 1974. Konrad Lorenz, a specialist on animal behavior, observes: "Amongst
passionate lovers of animals, particularly dog lovers, there is a special category of un-
happy people who, through bitter experience, have lost faith in mankind and seek ref-
uge with animals." K. LORENZ, MAN MEETS Doo 67 (1954). At the Boston Hills
Pet Memorial Park, gravestones carry such inscriptions as "Tootsie, Our Precious Baby.
She Gave Us The True Meaning of Love." N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1974, at 21.
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as her cat's) but also their inner characteristics. An owner may uncon-
sciously train his pet ;to be what he would like to be himself--obedient or
defiant, aggressive or quiet-and then identify with the pet. The pet is a
direct descendant of a totem animal utilized by man in his development and
civilization. Totemism was a device used by primitive man to control and
conceal sexual and aggressive drives; the pet serves the same purpose for
civilized man as the totem animal did -for the primitive.
3 4
Alert to this history, one entrepreneur has opened an establishment called
"Dogs for Neurotics." Those dogs that have some training are given a de-
gree called "Psychodog." These dogs offer emotional support, comparable
to the crutch that the blind derive from a seeing-eye dog. While it is gen-
erally considered racist to classify people, a score is given to every dog (and
to psychiatrists within the professional circle) according to their quality. The
selected virtues and faults receive marks in accordance with their rarity and
importance to the purpose.85
34. Heiman, Man and His Pet, in MOTIVATIONS IN PLAY, GAMES AND SPORTS 329
(R. Slovenko & J. Knight eds. 1967). Current studies cast light on the age-old
effect of pet birds on the mental health of pensioners living alone. In treating schizo-
phrenia, it has been found that dogs can be used successfully even where human
therapists have failed. Dr. Samuel A. Corson of Ohio State University uses so-called
"feeling heart" dogs, chosen for their warmth and friendliness, to treat patients who
did not respond to conventional therapy. In one case, for example, a young lady, diag-
nosed as a catatonic schizophrenic, was brought to the university hospital screaming
and disoriented. She did not respond to drugs or twenty-five sessions of electroshock
and instead became withdrawn, frozen and almost mute. She was given one of the
dogs as her constant companion and gradually recovered enough to be discharged from
the hospital. With the dogs, Dr. Corson reports, the patients become "different peo-
ple." N.Y. Times, March 25, 1974, at 1, col. 2; NEWSWEEK, April 22, 1974, at 80.
35. "We try to match the personalities of the dogs with the needs of specific pa-
tients," says Dr. Samuel Corson, quoted in My Dog, The Therapist, NEWSWEEK, April
22, 1974, at 80. Barbara Walters, on her television program, "Not For Women Only,"
National Broadcasting Co. (week of April 22, 1974), discussed the question, "What
kinds of animals go with what kinds of people?" According to the evidence, it seems
that the Chihuahua asks little but gives much in return-he is a compact bundle of
love and sunshine-not a "yappy" dog, but a very inquiring and interested little crea-
ture. The Beagle is almost never vicious; he has a resilient personality, tolerating a
great deal of pain or mistreatment without serious retaliation, and for this reason he
can be trusted with children, who often hurt accidentally. The Dachshund, often
caricatured for its short legs and long body, is an individualist, independent and
often stubborn. The Manchester, that "smooth-coated" dog, is a little slow to place
his confidence in anyone, but once he makes friends, it is a lasting friendship; he is
pretty much a one-man dog. The Pomeranian is known for his acute hearing and
alertness, is quick to sense the mood of his owner, and when sadness strikes, the sym-
pathy and love of a Pomeranian makes itself felt. He creeps close, touches his pink
tongue to his master's hand, and stays near. He never grows noisy or boisterous at
such a time; his deep sense of "propriety" tells him that this is not the time for merri-
ment.
Some other dogs may be mentioned, to wit, the Bulldog, bold and resolute; the Sheep-
dog, attentive; the Terrier, a bundle of energy; the Schnauzer, adaptable to any circum-
stances and climate; the Brittany Spaniel, possessed of keen intelligence and good judg-
ment.
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1',d jurst -like to know what ,,, hell ;s happ,,nhig, that's all' 'l like to know
what in bell is happening! Do you kno-P w,,hat in hell is happening?"
Reprinted with permission of THE NEW YORKER.
Surely we must look askance at intrusions of this relationship when we
consider some of the events that have occurred in court due to a lack of
a shield. Some pets can speak, though only by rote (like the witness de-
scribed as a "trained seal")Y6  To attack one person's character his parrot
was shown to say, "People are no damn good." Lawyers in New Orleans
are still talking about District Attorney Jim Garrison's chief investigator's
parakeet. The 'bird's vocabulary consists of two words: "Screw you!" The
bird was a veritable "stool pigeon." Dr. Alex Comfort in his famous edited
guide to love making, The Joy of Sex, in a chapter titled, "Birdsong at
Morning," suggests that parrots and mynahs be kept out of ,the love cham-
ber. They easily pick up what is said, and they cause bad social vibrations
36. In the belief that the language barrier between man and beast (including snakes
and elephants) can be broken, one author presents overwhelming scientific evidence
that man can communicate with the animals, for his own advantage. E. BORGESE, THE
LANGUAGE BARRIER: BEASTS AND MEN (1968). Regarding talking to plants, about
which there are a number of books, that is fine, though if the plants talk back, it is




when they repeat it. Dr. Comfort's book points out that what a person says
in orgasm should never be quoted at him or her-it is the time when people
are spiritually most naked. The wife of The Leopard in the novel used
to yell out "Gesumaria!
' '3 7
Not too long ago in Los Angeles a man was charged with smuggling a
parrot from Mexico. He denied that his bird came from south of the bor-
der. In a proceeding that smacked of the Star Chamber, investigators lis-
tened to the bird. "Buenos dias, sefior," the parrot said. Anyone who has
a pet for a pal would call this self-incriminating evidence. Possibly learning
of this case, thieves who broke into a home recently in Opelousas, Louisiana,
and made off with some $1,500 worth of goods apparently wanted no "stool
pigeon" to squeal on them. They took the family's talking parrot along.38
The essence of any privilege, of course, is that it may be waived by the
person who enjoys it; if an owner-pet shield law would be enacted, the
owner could waive it. In a recent case in Israel, Amos Meir complained
to the police that he had found his parrot, which had escaped a few days
earlier, at the home of another resident. The latter asserted, however, that
the bird was his. Meir countered that a German children's poem which his
parrot had been trained to recite would prove his ownership. A German-
speaking constable, closeted with the parrot, waited patiently for several
hours and then heard the parrot recite the poem. Justice won out. The
would be parrot owner was convicted of making a false claim of ownership.
But you may say that a psychotherapist cannot be analogized to a dog
or parrot, and you may say that a patient cannot be analogized to a pet
owner. You may be right, but then again, you may be wrong. It is not
a zoological error that Tevye, Sholem Aleichem's dairyman, often talked to
his horse. Who else really listened to him, who else understood him? In
Philip Roth's short story, "Whacking Off," the horse is replaced by the psy-
chiatrist. Dr. Roy R. Grinker, Sr., who had an analysis with Freud, recalls
that Freud had his dog in the room to assist him, a technique overlooked
37. THE JoY OF SEx/A GOURMET GuIDE TO LOVE MAKING 51 (A. Comfort ed.
1972).
38. Associated Press release, reported in N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1973, at 53. In a
number of cases arising in Switzerland, where a house was broken into at night and
the owner killed the intruder, the question arose as to whether or not his act was justi-
fiable homicide, for he might have enticed the victim to enter and then murdered him.
The defendant was allowed to establish his innocence by producing a dog, cat, or cock-
erel that lived with him and had witnessed the death of the burglar. The householder
was required to declare his innocence under oath in the presence of the pet. If the
pet did not contradict him, the court held that he had cleared himself. The legal the-
ory was that Heaven would intervene to bestow the gift of speech upon the pet rather
than allow a murderer to escape. G. CARSON, MEN, BEASTS, AND GODS: A HISTORY
OF CRUELTY AND KINDNESS TO ANImALS (1972).
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by his disciples. Freud was known as "the silent one," but an analysand
of his knew he was making progress, according to Dr. Grinker, when the
dog got excited and jumped on the couch.30
Persons may come to psychotherapy for relief of specific symptoms or dis-
abilities, but the underlying reason for seeking 'help is demoralization, a state
of mind that results from persistent failure to cope with internally or exter-
nally induced stresses. Dr. Jerome D. Frank, in his writings, states that all
psychotherapeutic rationales and rituals perform the function of combating
demoralization despite differences in content. Once psychotherapy is under-
stood to be a form of education, a means of restoring morale, and not part
of any medical system, a different view of the psychotherapeutic process,
regarding its relevance or materiality as evidence, will ensue.
The forum, we may also remember, is a factor in the type of script em-
ployed by the parties. Though not codified as a rule of law, the manner
and content of our conversation is tempered by where we talk. Speech like
clothes must be appropriate to the occasion. In the nature of things, one
speaks differently in a church than in a -tavern. Funerals require a pale
make up and solemn expression. The temple of justice, too, is traditionally a
place of civility. Chief Justice Burger, for example, regards dress and decorum
as seriously as he does the complex problems of the law and requires lawyers
to wear "conservative business dress." In jurisdictions with or without privi-
lege, a judge will look askance at the offer of data from psychotherapy ses-
sions. The setting itself forms something of a barrier, and there are certain
standards which people impose on themselves not because of any rule but
because good taste or other honorable prompting requires it. While there
is less reluctance to subpoena a psychiatrist than a priest, questions probing
into psychotherapy are likely to be regarded as offside, to use football termi-
nology. "Tut, tut," we 'hear the judge (though minutes earlier having ruled
adversely on a claim of privilege) admonishing an attorney asking impro-
prieties, "let's get on with the case."'40
39. The author's conversation with Dr. Grinker occurred at a meeting of the Amer-
ican Academy of Psychoanalysis in New York City, Dec. 6, 1973. Perhaps it is no
coincidence that Clement Freud, grandson of Sigmund Freud, hawks dog food on tele-
vision commercials. N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1974, at 29, col. 5.
40. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocA-
TION provides: "The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not mili-
tate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved
in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm." EC 7-10. "Judicial
hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and orderly procedures designed to
protect the rights of all parties. Although a lawyer has the duty to represent his client
zealously, he should not engage in any conduct that offends the dignity and decorum
of proceedings." EC 7-36. In People v. Whalen, 390 Mich. 672, 213 N.W.2d 116
(1973), the prosecutor was not allowed to impeach the defendant's alibi witnesses by
questions implying a lesbian relationship between the alibi witnesses. The court cited the
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Every situation has its own scripting. All the world's a stage, said Shake-
speare. The script or an answer depends not only on the question asked
but also on where the answer is made. Even so-called "free association"
in psychoanalysis and the "spontaneous" behavior in "encounter groups" can
be defined as learning the appropriate script for free association or spon-
taneous behavior. Those psychiatrists at universities who hold a joint ap-
pointment in law and psychiatry invariably see their patients at their medical
school office-never at their law school office-recognizing that atmosphere
evokes a certain posture and language. And that which takes place in one
forum may not be translatable to another. 41
A tribunal looks for legal artifacts, euphemistically called evidence. The
law script has its language and its boundaries, designed to reach a decision
that will balance conflicting interests in a way that is theoretically best for
all. 42  Proof-making in law is conditioned by the philosophy of jurispru-
State Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not "ask
any question that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case and that is
intended to degrade a witness or other person." Hence, while there may be no statu-
tory privilege, or it is riddled with exceptions, the psychiatrist can assure his patients
of confidentiality. All of life is based on probabilities, not certainties. Indeed, tax
return services advertise over television that they promise confidentiality, and they do
so although there is no statutory privilege.
41. In discussing the competency of psychiatric testimony in the courtroom, a leaf
might be borrowed from the history of the test, and methods of proof, of criminal re-
sponsibility, which has involved the appointment of psychiatrists to examine the ac-
cused. The Durham rule on criminal responsibility was formulated, in the words of
Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, its author, "to unfreeze what knowledge [examining]
psychiatrists did have, to irrigate a field parched by lack of information." But Durham
failed, the promise was unfulfilled, in the words of Judge Bazelon-this time spoken
angrily-because "psychiatrists continued to use conclusory labels without explaining
the origin, development, or manifestation of a disease [wow! (subjective editorial com-
ment)] in terms meaningful to a jury . . . . It was as if to maintain an illusory elit-
ism psychiatrists resorted to deliberate obscurantism." Speech at the American Psy-
chiatric Association Divisional Meeting in Williamsburg, Va., reported in Psychiatric
News, Nov. 7, 1973, at 1, col. 1. But what was really to be expected? To call for a
psychiatric history in the courtroom is in the vein of a cartoon showing an elderly hus-
band and wife at dinner, the husband saying, "This being our fifty-fifth anniversary,
would you like me to summarize?" NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 1973, at 190. Assuming
there is the time-the late Dr. Winfred Overholser once advised Judge Bazelon that it
would take fifty to one hundred hours to furnish the information he wanted-what infor-
mation would be included? Is there anything that happened to the accused (or to his
mother) that would not be relevant under the Durham test? Would the accused's mas-
turbatory fantasies when he was a boy have an effect on his state of mind at the time of
the offense? Judge Bazelon probably would have been more disappointed with a fifty to
one hundred hour diagnostic report than with the conclusory labels that he got. A
diagnostic effort has to be made in relation to the disposition; there is a saying, "Don't
bite off more than you can chew." And while calling for clarity, Judge Bazelon talked
about "disease," as though criminal behavior were due to an internal disorder or indwell-
ing agent. It smacks of the old belief in demon possession. It is one thing to find and
report an excess of protein in the blood and quite another to report on the dynamics
of behavior.
42. See I. ILLICH, TOOLS FOR CONVIIIT' 95 (1973); R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIAThY AND
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dence, the mechanisms of trial, and the rules of substantive and procedural
law current at a given time. A few illustrations will suffice. Most people,
practicing humility, avoid the use of any word or expression that imports
a fixed opinion; but in the courtroom, where a two-value logic system pre-
vails, a witness is expected to answer yes or no. Quite frequently the very
language of testimony is identical from one case to another. The criminal
law, moreover, says that the fact that a defendant has committed other
crimes is not admissible for the purpose of showing that he is more likely
to have perpetrated the crime charged. The criminal law functions without
revealing to the fact finder the previous conviction of even murder, but
in tort law, as in Lilschutz, disclosure was sought of psychotherapy which
occurred ten years previously.
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Conclusion
The concept of privilege, while it may offer a sense of security, should
be abandoned as a means of determining whether disclosure of communi-
cations made in psychotherapy should be required. For one thing, privilege,
an aristocratic idea, does not sit very well in the minds of many. But more
LAw 3 (1973). Weinstein describes the script in a law court thus:
That the parameters of the law mark out an artificial world is not necessarily
a valid basis for objection, for somewhat the same reason that it is not a tell-
ing criticism of the artistic quality of a painting by Chagall that it distorts
a scene; nor is it a proper objection to Sandburg's biography of Lincoln that
not everything then known about Lincoln is in the book. The trier's as well
as the artist's success in re-creating a world must be tested within the frame
of reference being used. The law is not interested in the "whole truth" but
only in the evidence on the propositions of fact it deems material .... Even
were it theoretically possible to ascertain truth with a fair degree of certainty,
it is doubtful whether the judicial system and rules of evidence would be de-
signed to do so. Trials in our judicial system are intended to do more than
merely determine what happened. Adjudication is a practical enterprise serv-
ing a variety of functions. Among the goals-in addition to truth finding-
which the rules of procedure and evidence in this country have sought to
satisfy are economizing of resources, inspiring confidence, supporting inde-
pendent social policies, permitting ease in prediction and application, adding
to the efficiency of the entire legal system, and tranquilizing disputants.
Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining Truth in Judicial Trials,
66 CoLLJm. L. REv. 223, 240-41 (1966). See also McCarthy, On Playing the Game of
Expert Witness in a Two-Value Logic System, 19 J. FOR. ScI. 130 (1974).
43. Evidence of other negligent conduct is usually ruled inadmissible in a tort case.
For example, in Florida East Coast Ry. v. Young, 104 Fla. 541, 140 So. 467 (1932), a
laborer had been struck by a train while he was pulling grass from between the railroad
ties. Counsel for the plaintiff sought to ask the engineer whether or not he had killed
anyone else in the operation of his engine, and if so, how many he had killed. (Appar-
ently he had killed two other men prior to the instant occurrence.) The court held that
it was highly improper to ask a question so manifestly prejudicial to the defendant, not-
ing further that it in no way established any fact from which the existence of liability
could properly have been adduced.
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importantly, privilege is, in the case of psychotherapy, an unnecessary and
misleading claim. Someone once said that in legal matters, when it is not
necessary to do anything, it is necessary to do nothing. Other guidelines in
the law of evidence-namely, relevancy and materiality-protect against in-
tervention in the psychotherapist-patient relationship, at least to the extent
that it would unfairly be a source of regret for patients.
It may be noted that the fictional archetype of the nineteenth century
was the detective Sherlock Holmes, the glorification of the power of rational
thinking, whereas the archetype of the twentieth century is Mickey Mouse.
Mickey effigies appear, among other places, on watches and shirts. A con-
temporary birthday card makes a Mickey out of the erstwhile sleuth;
it shows Holmes examining a marble column at close range with his magni-
fying glass, saying, "It's almost impossible to detect that you're one year
older. Happy Birthday!"' 44 Who would say that Holmes is looking in the
right place to establish what he is claiming? Yet it is just about as absurd
to look in a psychiatric office for evidence to be used in the courtroom.
In any event, the protection given to privacy is felt, rather than deduced
from a rule of law. "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.
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